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Abstract
This paper argues that the ubiquitous digital
networks in which we are increasingly becoming
immersed present a threat to our ability to exercise
free will. Using process philosophy, and expanding
upon understandings of causal autonomy, the paper
outlines a thematic analysis of diary studies and
interviews gathered in a project exploring the nature of
digital experience. It concludes that without
mindfulness in both the use and design of digital
devices and services we run the risk of allowing such
services to direct our daily lives in ways over which we
are increasingly losing control.

1. Introduction
The deployment of digital and social media
technologies is increasingly being understood as an
ethical issue [34] with negative intended [14] and
negative unintended consequences [39, 41]. In this
paper we argue that immersion in ubiquitous networks
of digital devices that take part in co-directing our lives
risks overwhelming the director within us. To counter
this risk IT mindfulness [22, 36, 42, 7, 38] is needed,
and should be factored into design and use.
We stress that we are not saying that the technology
itself is somehow ‘bad’. Bad design is responsible for
many of the issues that have been raised. However,
with the number of algorithms and the increasing
involvement of artificial intelligence in the running of
these technologies, designers are no longer necessarily
always in control themselves: algorithms can have
unintended consequences. With the digital, users add
content and interact sometimes in ways unanticipated
by designers. Mitigating risks, therefore, requires
conscious effort, both by users, and by designers.
However, and crucially, users may be overwhelmed by
the digital world they inhabit, as they try to coordinate
multiple independently designed digital devices while
they do not and cannot have the competencies to do so,
as the world of the digital continues to innovate at
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break-neck speed. But even if everything was good,
and all digital and social media technologies were
designed with the utmost care, we argue that there is
still too much of it: that it is possible to be
overwhelmed by too much of a good thing!
We argue that digital events may be happening
continuously in a way that we must better understand if
we are to investigate and possibly mitigate negative
consequences.
We first provide a philosophical
position on the nature of an ‘event,’ and then consider
what may be described as a ‘digital event.’ In the next
section we describe a continuum between polar
positions on how human actors and technology
interact [24]. We then outline our methodology and
provide examples from the empirical data and a
thematic analysis that supports our claims.1 In the last
section we seek to propose what might be done to
counter the problems we have identified.

2. Lenses for understanding digital events
In this section, we lay out the features of the series
of lenses, through which we examine the nature of an
‘event,’ and then what we understand as a ‘digital
event.’ Firstly, our analysis is based in the process
philosophy of Henri Bergson and Alfred North
Whitehead, and their focus upon duration, relation and
multiplicity – upon events – rather than upon fixed
things. In addition to this, however, we also make use
of the image of the ‘elephant and rider’ in the moral
psychology writings of Jonathan Haidt [13], and the
‘philosophy of the flesh’ introduced by Lakoff and
Johnson [21], as ways of understanding Bergson and
Whitehead’s concerns in the language of contemporary
psychology and philosophy.
These lenses for understanding are then further
refined, for the IS community, by relating insights
from process philosophy to the causal autonomy
dimension which stresses the relative role of human
actors and technology in their interaction [24]. We
1
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outline a continuum between pure Human Sovereignty
(HS) and complete Technological Autonomy (TA),
with the understandings of sociomateriality somewhere
in the middle, and the notion of ‘infomateriality’ [18]
closer to the Technological Autonomy end. We
propose some refinements to this continuum supported
by the empirical data from the project. We also make
use of Mark Coeckelbergh’s framing of the digital as a
space in which technology is increasingly responsible
for some co-direction of our lives [10].
2.1 Process philosophy
The two ‘fathers’ of process philosophy were
French philosopher Henri Bergson, and British
mathematician and philosopher Alfred North
Whitehead.
They
propose
‘event-ontologies’
[23, p. 232], in contrast to the ‘thing-ontology’ that is
the prevailing world view; i.e. they contend that
‘things’ may be reduced, ultimately, to ‘events’, in
contrast to the more positivistic approach which seeks
not only to reduce, but to eliminate ‘events’ in favour
of ‘things.’ Although modern physics does not “appear
to entail” such an event ontology, it is certainly
“consistent” with it [23, p. 234].
Both
philosophers
seek
to
re-integrate
consciousness and personal experience into a scientific
reality they regard as having banished it. Whilst they
both try thus to bridge the gap between subject and
object, Bergson errs somewhat on the side of the
subjective, and Whitehead somewhat on the side of the
objective. Bergson is thus the braver and more radical
philosopher, focussing on the facility of free will and
its place within the universe.
2.1.1 Bergson. Of all Bergson’s core ideas, the
durée reélle may perhaps be regarded as his primary
insight: an understanding of the nature of time
published as his first book, Time and Free Will [1].
For Bergson the will is intimately linked both to
consciousness and to duration. Free will – the ability to
choose between different possible courses of action –
is, for Bergson, an ontological quality of time
understood as consciously experienced duration in
which we play a part - the durée reélle. In mechanistic
physics, Bergson argues, by contrast, time is a property
of a deterministic causal closure, whereby all macro
phenomena result inescapably from micro phenomena,
and we – the observers – are absent, epiphenomenal,
impotent. This mechanistic universe could run from
beginning to end in 3 seconds or 3 trillion years: it
would make no difference. Bergson’s durée reélle,
however, hinges upon ‘indetermination’: the moments
of possibility within consciously experienced duration
when human choices can be made, and the universe
take a different course. This durational universe is

making itself up as it goes along, a ‘creative evolution,’
(the title of Bergson’s most famous book. [2])
Mechanistic time, crucially, like all equations, can
run forward or backward. Yet the nature of succession
in consciousness flows only forward. As Bergson
insists, this durational “succession exists, I am
conscious of it; it is a fact” [2, p. 368] - and it is when
free will is exercised. Our memory assists us with
weighing up different potential routes, and then we
choose, and action unfolds. From this, Bergson goes on
to elaborate a universe on the model of consciousness,
acknowledging that, for it to exist at all, it must have
been implicit from the very beginning [3, 35].
2.1.2 Whitehead. Whitehead’s cosmology and
metaphysics include his four-dimensional geometry in
which the process of concrescence – or gradual coming
to be and passing – of Actual Occasions into Objective
Data is described, and an organic philosophy that
results from this process-relational ontology. For
Whitehead, in the simplest terms, “the future does not
exist” [26, p. 4]. Whitehead represents “an effort to
think clearly and deeply about the obvious truth that
our world and our lives are dynamic, interrelated
processes, and to challenge the apparently obvious, but
fundamentally mistaken, idea that the world (including
ourselves) is made of things that exist independently of
such relationships” [26, p. 8]. Once we have grasped
this shift in perspective, it becomes clearer that the
building blocks of reality are no longer fixed things but
must be recognised as sets of interrelated events.
Whitehead’s geometry constitutes a fourth – and
better – description of reality than the three competing
views in quantum mechanics: (i) that reality is
particulate, with wave-like properties, (ii) that reality is
wave-like, with particulate properties, and (iii) that
nature, so determined by the means by which we study
it, e.g. giving us position but not momentum if studied
one way, or momentum but not position if studied
another, is so uncertain that it is simply not “capable of
fundamental characterisation at all” [11, p. ix]. The
fourth approach is to focus on becoming, rather than
being, as Whitehead does in his philosophy of events,
created at the same time that Einstein (i),
Schrödinger (ii) and Bohr (iii) were creating their own
views.
In Whitehead’s organic philosophy “everything
experiences” [33, p. 21]. In his view, “Biology is the
study of the larger organisms; whereas physics is the
study of the smaller organisms” [43, p. vi]. He thus
refuses to restrict sentience to the higher mammals and
insists that “every singular actuality” as it takes part in
the concrescence of new events “must be related to …
a world of antecedent actualities. In this regard, the
actuality is a subject whose object is a world of
antecedent
subjects”
[25, pp. 11–12].
Such
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panpsychism deems “All objects, or systems of objects,
[to] possess a singular inner experience of the world
around them” [33, p. 16], a world in which “experience
is impossible without an experiencer” [35, p. 23] and
“experiential phenomena cannot be emergent from
wholly non‐experiential phenomena” [35, p. 21]: a
world built, in other words, on a model of
consciousness.
2.1.3 A unified process approach. For Bergson,
the idea of a homogeneous and measurable time is an
artificial concept, a geometry for determinism.
Duration reinserts human experience into the universe.
Whitehead addresses this by focussing upon the notion
of the ‘event’ as a core unit of existence, in a ‘structure
of events’ [44, p. 52]. He speaks of “a duration” as “a
concrete slab of nature limited by simultaneity which is
an essential factor disclosed in sense-awareness”
[44, p. 53]. This ‘duration’ is something that is both
our subjective experience of an event: a non-physical
consciousness of what is unfolding; and what the
physico-chemical sciences would say about the
materiality engaged in the event: the movement of
molecules, dynamics of forces, mass, volume and
charge of the particles engaged in what is unfolding.
The accent is upon movement: reality is thus
describable only in terms of ‘periods’ during which
conscious and physical interactions and shifts occur.
Hence the term, ‘process’ philosophy.
The main difference between Bergson and
Whitehead is that for the former the universe is
qualitative and durational before it manifests itself as
physicality, albeit that without physicality it does not
exist. Now, as Whitehead said, “There is very little
large-scale
understanding,
even
among
mathematicians. There are snippets of understanding,
and there are snippets of connections between these
snippets” [45, p. 46]. This paper offers new snippets of
connections between snippets of understanding.
The key point arising from this philosophical
synthesis is that the fundamental fact of conscious free
will is inherent in the very fabric of the universe. This
is a universe not built upon (i) particles, (ii) waves,
(iii) neither, nor merely upon (iv) becoming. It is a
universe built upon the model of consciousness,
whereby choices are made and unfold through the
process of becoming. This has profound implications
for all disciplines.
This assertion is in keeping with the notion that it is
in ‘events’, in becoming, that reality is truly to be
found, rather than in things; that an event-ontology that
entails panpsychism rings truer than the positivistic
thing-ontology that underlies (and arguably
undermines) so much of contemporary scientific
thought [31]. What we perceive, moreover, as objects,
are not “senseless, valueless, purposeless” [43, p. 17],

but allow for affordances [17]. The physical, and
conceptual (mental) feelings always go together,
forming two poles within every entity, and everything
is related to everything else.
2.1.4 Contemporary views. More contemporary
writers than Bergson and Whitehead provide insights
that are strikingly in keeping with process philosophy.
According to Haidt [13], there are two kinds of
cognition: “the rider (controlled processes, including
‘reasoning-why’) and the elephant (automatic
processes, including emotion, intuition, and all forms
of ‘seeing-that’).” Automatic processes “run the
human mind, just as they have been running animal
minds for 500 million years, so they’re very good at
what they do, like software that has been improved
through thousands of product cycles.” The other
character in this dyad, “the rider, (language-based
reasoning) evolved because it did something useful for
the elephant.” The rider allows us to look “into the
future (because we can examine alternative scenarios
in our heads) and therefore it can help the elephant
make better decisions in the present” [13, pp. 53–54].
Here is Bergson’s mechanism of choice in the
moments when our consciousness intervenes in the
flow of the durée réelle. It is the durational time-scale
gap where (as Hirai [17] shows us) our ability to
compare possible routes into the future and choose one
literally constitutes our consciousness.
Lakoff and Johnson [21] describe this picture as a
Subject and a range of Selves. “The Subject is the
locus of consciousness, subjective experience, reason,
will.” In addition to this, “there is at least one Self and
possibly more. The Selves consist of everything else
about us – our bodies, our social roles, our histories”
[21, p. 268]. Crucially, “The Subject is that aspect of a
person that is the experiencing consciousness and the
locus of reason, will, and judgement, which, by its
nature, exists only in the present” [21, p. 269 emphasis
in original] – this is clearly the experiencer of durée
and exerciser of free will in Bergson’s worldview.
Armed with these philosophical and psychological
insights, we will now consider 'digital events’. We
will use the metaphor of the elephant and rider not just
in the sense meant by Haidt, but recalling the process
philosophy by which the rider – as Subject and as
consciousness – expresses the free will that helps
constitute not only ourselves but a universe understood
upon the model of consciousness, in which such
Human Sovereignty is a moral, ethical, and political
good. This model of the universe, as we shall see, is
threatened by the digital world we increasingly inhabit.
2.2 Human Sovereignty and Technological
Autonomy
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When studying cause-effects relationships between
human actors and IT, a spectrum of positions can be
considered between two poles [24]. At one pole,
“Human Sovereignty” (HS), in fact a traditional
position, considers that “technology is an inanimate
product of intentional human action and therefore only
people can be viewed as causal” [24, p. 1269].
Technology cannot take initiatives: it strictly follows a
plan designed by human actors. This typically applies
to situations where decisions are the object of human
deliberation and are supported by tools providing some
information related to the task but not acting.
At the other end of the spectrum, with “Technology
Autonomy” (TA) Markus and Rowe consider that
“technology can affect humans and operate with
limited human intervention” [24, p. 1270]. Some
autonomous systems such as automated transportation
systems do not only operate without drivers but are
regulated in highly automated ways. They are copiloted both by some artificial intelligence and by
humans. However, these directive decision devices are
designed to actively prevent human intervention into
their operation [37]. Human surveillance may be
necessary, but intervention remains very infrequent and
considered only when facing a crisis situation (e.g.
safety). When relying on deep learning, they can take a
life of their own (we do not need to grant them with
consciousness for that i.e. to qualify them as strong
Artificial Intelligence) [20].
In between these two poles representing concrete
and actual situations – inanimate products that simply
inform and cannot act, and systems that can have a life
of their own – there is a spectrum of situations. First,
operations can be run by humans with decision aids for
handling simple to complex tasks that may interact or
not. By complex tasks we mean tasks that can
encounter a considerable diversity of situations and
actors so that their outcomes are very context
dependent and cannot be predicted with great
precision.
In such cases technology can take some initiatives
and decide within some limits what is to be done,
beyond which humans have to intervene. We may call
these semi-autonomous systems. Such situations are
typical of our digital world and the web 3.0 – the
newly mangled internet of things and people [19, 28].
In these situations, the objective is to regulate some
function, or maintenance (of industry, homes, cities,
human health conditions). Semi-autonomous systems
can be placed on a continuum between the abovementioned poles of human sovereignty aka non
autonomous systems and technology autonomy aka
fully autonomous systems. In the case of autonomous
cars, one distinguishes level 1: one or a set of functions
(e.g. cruise control) being automated with no

interactions among them; level 2: at least two functions
interacting automatically; level 3: temporarily the car is
taking full control, but in complex situations the driver
is notified to regain control; level 4: no driver is
required, aka this is an autonomous system [15].
Between level 0 (HS) and level 4 (TA), three types of
digital events can thus be experienced by the driver.
Co-piloting or auto-pilot does not demand nor reflect
the same physical engagement with the car and
attention to the dashboard as we move from level 1 to
level 3.
In the case of autonomous cars, Bruckes et al.
assert that "situational normality of using autonomous
systems increases the perceived ease of use.” [5].
However, the normality of the situation as perceived by
users is highly debatable and does not only depend on
the technology and its embeddedness in a (level 4)
autonomous product but also on the environmental
context which may include different people
and stakeholders and connected technologies. The
presence of other people and networked devices may
considerably affect risk perception, capacity to
understand and act, and reinforce a feeling of being
overwhelmed – not so much by quantity as by
complexity. [27].
Digital transformation of our lives and societies
goes beyond moving towards higher degrees of
technology autonomy in the sense described above
which focuses on action. Social media and robots once
introduced in our homes shape how our individual
times and actions unfold in our social life and
existence. Thus, they may give it a different meaning
and reflect an ontological shift from a causal
mechanism such as automation levels supporting
action (described above) to how we constitutively
ascribe meaning to our world and existence [24].
Social media puts us frontstage “acting in a play that is
not only written by me but also by others and by the
technologies and media I use” [10, p. 35]. We do not
only set the targets for driving somewhere, for
maintaining our homes at certain temperatures and
refilling our refrigerators, the digital tools we use also
create other unexpected interactions that shape our
lives in what we do (or continue to do) and don’t, and
the sequence in which we do things and ascribe
meaning to what we ordinarily do such as getting up in
the morning. “Technology is not just something we use
in our performances [...] and not even just a potential
co-actor (actant), but also an author and director of
these performances” [10, p. 27]. To what extent is it an
author of our lives? To what extent does it set certain
goals indirectly by switching our attention or directly
by certain impositions?
2.2.1 Digital events as co-directors. In
Whitehead’s philosophy we can see that an ‘event’ is
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unbounded; Whitehead’s temporal geometry shows
how for any event, there is a beginning which involves
everything around it, a middle which is always a
process, and an end which involves passing into a past
where it becomes the stuff from which other events are
made. Crucially, the present is where subjectivity
resides, the past being the objects from which it is
made up: a panpsychic level of consciousness
permeates all interrelations, and all events contain and
are contained within other events. The boundaries
between events thus become almost indistinguishable
in a field of continuously unfolding, interpenetrative
and interoperable multiplicity. Focussing upon the
discrete reveals only one perspective; acknowledging
the multiple provides a glimpse of the complexity and
contingency of the real.
We see that Digital Events are also unbounded
through their interactions, in this manner. Along the
continuum from Human Sovereignty to Technological
Autonomy, we have therefore identified three distinct
gradations, to which we have given a nomenclature of
DE1, DE2, and DE3, denoting three kinds of Digital
Events along that continuum, whilst acknowledging
that finer gradations might also be delineated, through
further examination.
Digital
Event
DE0
DE1
DE2
DE3
DE4

Table 1 Typology of Digital Events
Definition
Products that simply inform and cannot act
One or more automated functions with no
interactions among them
Minimum
two
functions
interacting
automatically
The system taking full control temporarily
though in complex situations the human is
notified to regain full control
Autonomous system. No human required

Digital Events of type 1 (DE1) – using third-party
applications on the platform devices in our hands that
source assets and processing from remote servers – are
commonplace and not the focus of this paper. DE2 –
where two or more services or functions are interacting
with each other in the background – have also become
so commonplace we hardly notice them. DE3 are
typical of the Web 3.0 A.I.-powered future we are
being invited to embrace, and which in this paper we
are concerned may require risk-mitigating design
and/or use focus. As with events in Whitehead’s
ontology, the boundaries between these types of digital
events are indistinct, and each contain and are
contained by other digital events.
Thus, in contemporary highly technological
society, we contend, there are unbounded digital events

that are increasingly immersive and ubiquitous – closer
to DE3 than to DE1 – whose obligations upon us seem
to weigh as heavily as those related to our peers: where
the digital tools we use become co-directors of our
lives as powerfully as other people – and indeed
constitutively causal in the development of the Selves
surrounding the Subject who is experiencing; our
becoming ourselves is co-constituted not only by those
around us, but by these digital events.
Nor are they always benign. Already in our
experience of what seem like DE2 Events, such as
engaging with social media on our smartphones,
elements of what defines DE3 events are at play. Nir
Eyal [12] describes how “The technologies we use
have turned into compulsions, if not full-fledged
addictions. It’s the impulse to check a message
notification. It’s the pull to visit YouTube, Facebook,
or Twitter for just a few minutes, only to find yourself
still tapping and scrolling an hour later. It’s the urge
you likely feel throughout the day, but hardly notice”
[12, p. 1]. The ‘hook’ model [12, p. 4] he describes
“brings together an understanding of user behaviour
and a carefully considered set of interactions that
entice people into using a product or service more and
more. If you can connect a user’s need (unconscious or
otherwise) with your service frequently enough … the
user will begin to form a habit of using it.” [6 p.67]. By
repeatedly looping through the steps, “the user begins
to associate the behaviour with their own internal
motivations and emotions” [12, p4] These habits are
self-reinforcing through reward and admonishments.
Such ‘hooks,’ in the context of our philosophical
lenses, can be read as a case of technologies driving the
elephant, of the system of elephant-computer
interaction
taking
temporary
full
control,
overwhelming what might be the more considered –
conscious and durational - intentions of the rider. This
is nearer to DE3 than to DE2. All too often it is the
deliberate intent of the designer to appeal directly to
the elephant, sidestepping the rider through carefully
integrated psychological tricks [32]. There is a
growing amount of literature on the ways in which
social networks, in particular, undertake this kind of
trickery [e.g. 40].
When we say, then, when asked, that we are
acquiescent to the tricks of digital companies like
Facebook, that we understand they use our data
because they are a business, is our surrender not also a
surrendering of an awareness of the risks involved? If
we are, as Haidt and Lakoff and Johnson show, all too
often guided rather by the elephant than the rider, when
we are immersed in DE3 type networks that are geared
toward driving the elephant, just who is in control? Is
our consciousness making choices, or are the automatic
processes of our bodies being led by automated hooks?
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There is a tangible danger of our ability to choose
being overwhelmed when too many DE3s are present.
This constitutes a modification to Coeckelbergh’s
co-direction: it suggests that in the right (or wrong)
circumstances, we are no longer co-directing our own
lives, but subject to the hooks, tricks, and controls of
the ubiquitous digital environments in which we are
immersed: that our lives are being directed. While this
may be reasonable in certain circumstances, more and
more digital events are occurring beyond DE3 type
events at the Technological Autonomy end of the
spectrum. If true, this leads us to refine our sociotechnical perspectives. In particular, not only the
human-centred human sovereignty ideal may have
become a modern demagogical myth, but the academic
perspective on sociomateriality may soon be outdated.
First, at the heart of this latter perspective is the idea
that the social and the material cannot be distinguished
fundamentally [29]. However, sociomateriality does
not sufficiently and precisely reflect the nature of the
tools that have become constitutive of the physical
context in which we live. This a world which we have
made and are rapidly remaking, through a digital
transformation process which represents an
anthropogenic shift. We argue only the notion of the
‘infomaterial’ truly acknowledges the key element of
human meaning already inherent within ‘information’
[8, 18] as causal [24]. Second, based on process
philosophy we argue that, unlike sociomateriality,
infomateriality focuses more upon the physical and the
durational, and less upon ephemeral social ‘structures.’

knowledge and experience of the digital world. Diary
studies were undertaken with a total of 12 participants.
Diaries lasted typically for 4-6 weeks, with 2-3 entries
per week, and 2 interviews were then undertaken.
Thus, although our participants were not a
statistically representative cohort, we were able to
infer, from our knowledge of the participants, that a
reasonably wide range of backgrounds, income
brackets, and educational levels were represented, as
well as a reasonable gender balance. Interviews were
recorded, typed by an independent transcriber, and then
imported into NVivo. An interview plan was drawn up
in advance, dividing each simply into three parts:
(i) follow-on questions arising from their diary entries,
(ii) privacy issues around online services in general,
(iii) opinions on personal online digital experience.

3. Methodology

4.1 Single and multiple events

With a tight timescale of only a few months, this
study was more a proof-of-concept pilot of what and
how people experience the physical and durational in
their digital world and where digital events fit in the
HS→TA continuum than a full study, and was focused
on obtaining quality in-depth information. We were
conscious that when seeking information on digital
experience there are a number of ‘digital divides’ to
consider, including in the younger generation, for
whom the digital world is something they have grown
up with; education and family income remain key to
access beyond the cheapest smartphones with limited
data allowance. If this younger generation, we
reasoned, were finding new technologies encroaching
upon their conscious ability to direct their own lives,
then surely other, older generations, would be finding
this even more so. We recruited, therefore, a small
cohort of participants, aged 18-25, from both IT and
non-IT backgrounds, aiming to garner responses
representing a spectrum from digital novice to in-depth

Although participants were asked to describe in
their diary entries their experience of discrete digital
events on a single digital device, in a finding redolent
of the unboundedness of digital events, and the
richness and complexity of people’s digital
interactions, we found that the 75 diary entries in fact
describe multiple digital events across a range of
applications on their devices. Not one of the entries
describe single discrete digital events. Some 68% of
entries describe several discrete digital events taking
place at the same time within the one device. A third
category - the other 32% - describe several non-distinct
or combined simultaneous digital events involving
multiple applications. For us this means that the digital
event world – especially of this latter group - is more
multiple and continuous than made of single discrete
and unique events, and this is very redolent of
Whitehead’s process-relational vision of events in
general.

4. Findings
Our analysis made use of a priori themes: the
framework on digital events described in section 2,
with Eyal’s notion of the ‘hook,’ Haidt’s metaphor of
elephant and rider, the HS→TA spectrum, and the
process philosophy of Bergson and Whitehead. With
all the diary entries and interviews entered into NVivo,
we employed search terms with NVivo synonyms and
coded the data using thematic analysis [4]. Our coding
was thus not an inductive process. Through this
analysis we hope to approach a philosophical
explanation, not yet a theory, that speaks to the IS
community.
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4.2 From directing, to co-direction to being
directed?
In our thematic analysis, we found that the data
demonstrates all three types of digital events. In Table
2 we present example diary entries for each.
Table 2 Examples of Digital Event Types
Digital Example [participant code]
Event
DE1
I'm using my iPhone to listen to music Spotify. I generally listen to the "Daily
Mix" playlists that are personalised for me
on my previous usage. Extremely good and
the playlists generally get better the longer
you use Spotify for. [A3-26]
DE2
I enjoy the simplicity of being able to login
with one account and have access to all of
these different tools simply by being logged
into Chrome. [A3-26]
DE3
I feel like we probably take all these
services for granted like Gmail, Yahoo or
whoever it is nowadays and we think, ‘oh,
we can trust them, they can take decisions
for us and will make sure that we receive
the right emails in our inbox and everything
that is spam will go into the junk folder’. I
believe maybe they should do it from time
to time, like an update of settings or
something… Two weeks ago I switched my
bank and I was receiving the emails in my
inbox for the first few days and then I was
expecting a status on the switch process and
I didn’t receive anything. I had to ring them
and they said everything is fine and I don’t
usually check my spam folder and I
checked it and all the emails after that went
to my junk. I missed out on something
because there was a direct debit that was
supposed to come through and because I
didn’t receive the email on time I missed
out on that so I had to pay a bit over… [A316]
In the DE1 example there is a simple engagement
with a single function on the smartphone – Spotify –
that delivers music from that service. In the DE2
example multiple services are used together to provide
benefits to the user, with a consistent experience of all
tools being provided through a single login. In the
DE3 example, however, the participant is very clear
that they want to retain autonomy and control, rather
than give it over to a third-party email provider. The
administration process for a new banking customer is
highly or at least partly automated. At the stage

referred to in this quote, A3-16, the customer, is
probably expected to sign some documents that are
being sent automatically, and/or be informed of this
direct debit. However the fact that (s)he is only
informed by email and that quite late, because it went
into his/her spam folder, has several negative
consequences (being worried, calling the bank, having
to check the spam folder, having to pay more) that
could have been avoided if (s)he had been contacted by
the bank to inform him/her that the switch had been
made. It is clear that had the participant had better
control of the situation, there would have been fewer
problems. Has free will been properly exercised
through this mesh of interconnected automated
systems? Or has automation interfered and thwarted
conscious direction?
The analysis of the data is thus suggestive of the
phenomenon of co-direction identified in Section 2, in
instances of participants’ feeling a lack of control. For
example, the diary entries in Table 3 represent several
nuanced aspects of control.
Table 3 Examples of control issues
I will use the phone throughout the day to speak to
my girlfriend and friends while also checking social
apps during lunch and breaks and the occasional bit
of shopping (Amazon, eBay etc.). (A1-39)
Today I used Instagram a lot as some of my friends
are on holiday and they were uploading videos and
pictures on their Instagram... however seeing all of
these videos from several friends enjoying
themselves whilst I was at work made me feel quite
down and like I was missing out on things. (A1-31)
There are bits of the old way of doing things I still
prefer doing like switching my thermostat on
manually rather than having a Hive or a Nest
controlling that. Or I prefer using the remote control
to switch to a channel instead of asking for Alexa to
do that for me. (A3-16)
In the case of A1-39 it should be noted that
‘checking’ can all too often be read as symptomatic of
a ‘fear of missing out’ (FOMO) [30], a well-known
psychological trait of addictive behaviour, and clearly
an example of Eyal’s ‘hooks’ at work.
Most importantly however, the analysis revealed a
number of examples of feeling overwhelmed by digital
experience, as in the case here of A1-31, whose lack of
control brings on the depression aspect of FOMO, and
in particular A3-16 who prefers to retain conscious
control rather than cede simple tasks to a digital
assistant. As we move towards DE3 types of events
and closer to automated systems such as Hive, Alexa
or Nest, A3-16 exhibits a perception that there is a risk
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in surrendering our awareness and control to such
systems.
With certain systems such as social networks, then,
we may get depressed because we feel we have to
check, but checking does us no good. With other
automated systems that are based on relieving us from
the task of checking such as Hive, Alexa or Nest, we
can get worried that it may not be trustworthy and that
we will have to control/check it. What is common in
these apparently contrasting examples is that when we
feel we have to or would have to control/check more
than we would normally, we are in fact dissatisfied.
This control/checking issue is generated by the digital
society.
Conscious control and a lack of control, therefore,
are issues our participants are concerned with
regarding some types of digital events. Situations in
which we direct our technologies to serve us, becoming
situations in which new technologies seem to be
increasingly co-directing our activities, need to stay
short of situations in which our technologies are
directing our activities.

5. Mindfulness
How then do we counter these problems? Bergson
scholar Yasushi Hirai suggests that “In terms of digital
events, it might be worth reconsidering the timeefficiency fundamentalism of technology: it risks
decreasing the heterogeneity, i.e. thickness, of our
various timescales, which is the very ground for our
mindful enjoyment of experience.” [17] Time, in other
words, and the mindfulness with which to experience
it, is, in Hirai’s reading of Bergson for the 21st century,
the very essence of our free will, of our ability to be the
rider of the elephant and direct it as we will. Our daily
experiences encompass but go beyond digital events
and require a general mindfulness. In the context of
digital events, then, an ‘IT mindfulness’ is required.
Brown and Ryan define mindfulness as “The state
of being attentive to and aware of what is taking place
in the present” [7, p822]. While Thatcher et. al.’s
conceptualization of IT mindfulness is clearly that of a
trait, Brown and Ryan’s conceptualization of
mindfulness is that of both a state and a trait. [38, 7,
p824]. Both consistent with Weick and Putnam [42]
and Brown and Ryan [7], we define IT mindfulness as
an open awareness of and attention to current digital
experience which may be reflected in a more regular or
sustained consciousness of ongoing events, and which
allows sufficient time and awareness to make informed
choices. Without that time and IT mindfulness – in a
fast-paced world of constant digital stimulation – the
rider is at risk of being overwhelmed by the elephant,

and the elephant driven by the many stimuli around it,
not by ourselves.
Mindfulness, in the IS and Organisational literature,
has been largely of what Weick and Putnam describe
as a Western, conceptual, flavour [42, 22]. They quote
Gunaratana to describe the more Eastern conception:
“Mindfulness is very much like what you see with your
peripheral vision as opposed to the hard focus of
normal or central vision. Yet this moment of soft,
unfocussed awareness contains a very deep sort of
knowing that is lost as soon as you focus your mind
and objectify the object into a thing.”[42] This is very
redolent of Bergson’s intuition philosophique [3, p33],
by which the objectification performed by the intellect,
looking back on what has passed, can be superseded by
a more Gestalt awareness of durée reélle in the now.
This is in keeping with the impermanence implicit in
the Eastern conception of mindfulness. Gunaratana
says, again, “there are really no entities that are
unchanging or permanent, only processes.” [42]. By
the same token, however, the more Western conception
of mindfulness, represented principally by the work of
Langer, chimes better with Haidt’s image of rider and
elephant, and the dangers of acting on “automatic
pilot.” [42, 22]. As Weick and Putnam conclude, then,
there is scope for us to “transcend the constraints of
conceptual mindfulness and incorporate Eastern
insights” [42]. Process philosophy, we argue, offers
just such scope.
Participants in the project spoke of taking time out,
through distancing themselves from their digital
devices for periods of time, switching off in order to
focus on the simpler pleasures of words on paper. They
expressed a desire to stay mindful to their experience,
and not to the demands of the digital. Interestingly,
some of their digital experiences were leading to
delusion [42] and fear of being abused (see Table 4).
Table 4 Examples of Mindfulness / Delusion
Today I browsed on the dating app Tinder too
just looking… Hopefully meet someone off it but I
never feel that positive about it. The app is not really
enjoyable because everyone feels disposable in a
way. It's easy to use but there's not much to it.
Literally a swip[e] to the left or right. For that reason
I don't use the app that much. (A1-31)
I am not into all these Alexas/Nest that is privacy
again, Alexa I heard stuff, Alexa listening to you all
the time, to your conversations in the house and
targeting adverts depending on what you’ve talked
about and I don’t want to do that, or Hive knowing
what time I’m home, you know, when I am in work
and stuff like that. So, what is private? As long as I
can control it I will try and do that. (A3-16)
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Clearly, for A1-31, there is both a habitual – hookdriven - behaviour, and a consciousness and resistance
to that habitual behaviour, in their relationship with the
dating app. For A3-16 the prospect of being listened to
by Smart Home assistants is very off-putting. In both
these cases the participants express a sense that their
digital experiences in some sense dehumanise –
making people feel ‘disposable’ or lacking privacy. So,
switching off our digital devices from time to time in
order to listen to our own elephant rider, we would
argue, is an example of the kind of moderation
foregrounded by many moral philosophies [16].
In today’s world of digital events, then, resistance
to the fateful allure that is not only possible but sought
by many of the technologies around us becomes key.
Reading, exercising and other involvements instead of
smartphones, along with the non-adoption of some
technologies seen as clearly overstepping certain
boundaries, all express concerns about being
sufficiently in control of the digital influences in order
to be able to put them down, to have ‘me time’.
The future does not exist, and the universe is
making itself up as it goes along – through our
consciousness. These are the primary lessons from
process philosophy. The Mindfulness required of us,
then, is clearly of existential importance.

6. Conclusion
‘Infomateriality’, we contend, is a notion by which
we might understand the true nature of the ubiquitous,
always-on computational world information systems
have brought about, in which digital events are
unfolding at all times, all around us, to us, by us,
between us. It may be understood as a condition of
human societies in which our exchange of information,
and the digital tools with which we undertake that
exchange, have become co-constitutive of the physical
context in which we live, and are increasingly
becoming co-directors of our lives.
The responses from the participants in our project,
confronted with the unique synthesis of Bergson and
Whitehead’s process philosophies and the other lenses
we have used for our thematic analysis, as this paper
has demonstrated, bear this out.
‘Infomateriality’ returns individual experience to a
centrality of scientific understanding from which it has
been wrongly banished, alongside the broader social
and material conditions our analyses may explore, in
our understanding of what information is, what
material reality is, what it is like, and how the
enactment of information is constitutive of individuals,
societies, and the materiality of the world we inhabit.

The infomaterial is thus a concept for today’s
“always on” digital world, and enjoins us, as designers
and users of information systems, (i) to make room for
mindfulness, and (ii) to approach our work as
technologists with the strongest ethical principles,
cognizant of the co-directional power of the
technologies we deploy into people’s lives.
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